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DTIC ADA612249: Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division in Korea, July 1950

When the 24th Infantry Division deployed to Korea in July 1950 it experienced a series of defeats from 5-20 July in an attempt to delay the invading North Korean People's Army (NKPA). The division suffered devastating losses of men and equipment and was withdrawn from combat because it was no longer capable of effective combat operations. Despite the losses, many commanders and historians consider the operation a strategic success. Never the less, historians blamed the appalling losses and demoralizing defeats of 5-20 July on poor training, poor equipment, and lazy, ill-disciplined soldiers of an occupation army. This is a simplistic and remarkably linear understanding of the causes of what happened to the 24th Infantry Division. The Far East Command developed a sound operational approach to confront the invading North Korean People's Army. General MacArthur intended to take full advantage of his strengths in air, naval and amphibious superiority while capitalizing on North Korean weaknesses and vulnerability to a deep envelopment. However, the shaping operation to delay the NKPA with the 24th Infantry Division was poorly conceived. They based the operation on the illusion that the

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