English
This study analyzes the German failure to decisively conclude Operation Barbarossa by capturing Moscow, asking whether this failure was the result of disregard for the principle of the objective. The failure at Moscow was the first significant setback for the German Army in World War II. The role played by the notion of the objective in the pre-World War II German Army is investigated along with the backgrounds and personalities of the principal military and civilian leaders involved in the campaign. These background chapters provide the insight needed to understand the relationship that existed between the tactical commander and his superiors during the detailed planning and execution of Operation Barbarossa.
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DTIC Archive · DePrie,Michael C · ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KANS · *MILITARY OPERATIONS · *WARFARE · MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES) · USSR · STRATEGY · MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN) · HISTORY