English

DTIC ADA176083: The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The War of Attrition and Preparations Preceding the October 1973 War

This study is a historical analysis of two definitive periods of the conflict between July 1967 and August 1970, and the period of 'No Peace, No War' between August 1970 and 6 October 1973. The study discusses the lessons learned by Egypt and Israel following the Six-Day War. The lessons of the Six-Day War were not lost on the Egyptian leaders. President Nasser's assessment of the military aspects of the war revealed several shortfalls in Egypt's military capabilities and superiorities of Israel's forces which needed modifying before Egypt could successfully mount a campaign against Israel. President Sadat believed Israel's intrasigence in retaining the occupied territories could only be changed by taking actions which would cause the United States, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations to become involved. Sadat's decision to go to war was a political gamble designed to end the stalemate. Israel's military leaders constantly underrated the Egyptian's armed forces potentials. Military and political leader continually misread Nasser's and Sadat's intentions and their resolve to regain the occupied territories.

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