English

DTIC ADA196038: Calculated Risk? Military Theory and the Allies Campaign in Italy, 1943- 1944

This monograph examines the Allies' campaign in the Mediterranean in 1943-1944 in order to answer the question of whether the Allies could have won and, if so, how. This study looks at the utility of military theory for explaining cause and effect, and for providing a basis for operational insight and assessment of risk. It first reviews the strategic background and Allied planning at the campaign and major operation level, focusing on the critical time of December 1943. Then it reviews the results of the execution of those plans. Given these results it turns to analyze the Allied actions, to trace effects back to their causes and to evaluate the means employed utilizing theory as the framework for the analysis. This analysis forms the basis from which to draw conclusions regarding the utility of theory for this campaign. There were three conclusion reached. The operational commanders involved did not have a full appreciation of the operational risks taken when major operations were designed and executed in January 1944. The operational and strategic commanders may have chosen a different course of action if these risks had been more fully appreciated. Classical theory, as represen

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