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DTIC ADA338886: Intelligence Successes and Failures in Operations Desert Shield/Storm. Report of the Oversight and Investigations SubCommittee of the Committee on Armed Services House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress, First Se

Professionals commonly divide intelligence into three broad categories-collection, distribution and analysis. Using those divisions, one can draw some broad overall conclusions: * Intelligence collection in Operation Desert Storm was generally very good and deserving of praise, although there were some major problems. * Intelligence distribution within the theater was very poor from the standpoint of many Air Force units. * Intelligence analysis was mixed. On the most prominent analytical challenge of Operation Desert Storm the count of dead Iraqi tanks, APCs and artillery pieces the intelligence community had no generally accepted doctrine or methodology. The resulting problems of assessing battlefield damage revealed the true intelligence failure of Operation Desert Storm. This report looks separately at intelligence collection, distribution and analysis, focusin on the core successes and failures in each of those categories. is report is the intelligence supplement to Defense for a New Era: Lessons of the Persian Gulf War, released in April 1992 by the House Armed Services Committee.

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