English
The National Military Strategy outlines the U.S. military concept for winning two nearly simultaneous Major Theaters of War: concentrate in one, shift assets to the second, and win the second. The U.S. doctrine calls for the use of decisive force in a concentration against its enemies. Army doctrine supports this concept as well. Army Field Manual 100-5 still includes the idea of concentration under the principle of war of mass. The origin of the U.S. military thinking on concentration comes from the beginnings of the Republic. After the Napoleonic Wars, there were two schools of thought: Archduke Charles and Jomini. Antoine Jomini advocated distribution as a necessary precursor to concentration. These schools of thought dominated pre-Civil War U.S. Army. The U.S. Army was oriented on a cordon defense. Jefferson Davis, having learned this during his time as the U.S. Secretary of War, attempted to implement a cordon defense when he became the President of the Confederacy. Other Confederate strategists advocated a Jominian concentration. One of the earliest was P. G. T. Beauregard, who generally suggested a concentration on the Tennessee theater. The Confederacy responded to the cris
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Ebook · DTIC ADA389820: Confederate Strategy in 1863: Was a Strategic Concentration Possible? · Defense Technical Information Center · Internet Archive
DTIC Archive · White, D J · ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES · *MILITARY STRATEGY · MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES) · THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS · MILITARY DOCTRINE · MILITARY PLANNING ·