English
On 2 April 1982, Argentinean forces invaded the Malvinas. Three days after the invasion, the largest task force in recent British history left Great Britain. The Argentinean military junta had not foreseen the British military response, and therefore did not plan for the defense of the Malvinas after the invasion. They believed that their action would only result in economic measures by the international community. They fully expected a successful transfer of sovereignty over the Malvinas from the British to Buenos Aires. But on 14 June, three weeks after the British landing, the Argentinean forces surrendered in Puerto Argentino. This paper will focus on the mistakes the Argentineans made in 1982 that led to their defeat by the British forces. First, they underestimated the diplomatic and political messages of the British. The Argentineans realized the British did not have economic reasons to defend the Falklands, but misjudged the British in their feelings for sovereignty and desire to defeat apparent aggression. Second, the British proved, by the dispatch of a task force, that they were willing to fight a war over the Falklands. Argentinean military appreciation of the situation
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Ebook · DTIC ADA519343: The Falklands/Malvinas 1982: Why Didn't Argentina Win the War? · Defense Technical Information Center · Internet Archive
DTIC Archive · · MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLL QUANTICO VA · *UNITED KINGDOM · *FALKLAND ISLANDS · *ARGENTINA · *AERIAL WARFARE · *DEFENSE PLANNING · *LAND WARFARE · *NAVAL WARFARE