English

DTIC ADA566622: Poland: Lone Eagle over Europe

The military defeat of Poland in 1939 was not the result of fighting the combined armies of Germany and the Soviet Union. Rather, the failure can be attributed to Poland's political hubris of pursuing two strategic imperatives, independence from Russia and regional dominance in Eastern Europe, using primarily military means. This monograph examines how Poland used its military to achieve its strategic imperatives across four time-periods in its history spanning 1764 to 1939. The specific time-periods are as follows: (1) 1764-1918, the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to the Second Polish Republic; (2) 1918-1926, the Treaty of Riga to Jozef Pilsudski's coup; (3) Pilsudski's coup to Pilsudski's death; and (4) the rise of the Nazi war machine to Poland's military failure. Using the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) methodology as an instrument of analysis, the monograph reveals that Poland was a militaristic state that followed French military theory and doctrine. However, for a brief period when at war with the Russians, a unique Polish theory and doctrine emerged. There is evidence that Poland used operational art as an approach to defeat the R

Sign in with your free account to read, download EPUBs or listen.