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DTIC ADA495487: Tactics in Counterinsurgency

This manual gives the US Army a common language, concept, and purpose to fight and achieve success in a counterinsurgency. COIN is a complex subset of warfare that encompasses all military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency at the company, battalion, and brigade levels. To do this, the manual merges traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of the current operational environment. The US Army thinking and doctrine on COIN tactics since the end of World War II have focused on the conduct of counterguerrilla operations in the later stages of insurgency. The Army has seen itself as defeating guerrilla forces-usually communist forces-rather than defeating an entire insurgency. It saw success as something it could achieve by using the force of arms directly against guerrilla forces. This doctrine of COIN began to take shape shortly after World War II in manuals such as FM 31-20, Operations against Guerrilla Forces (1951) and later in FM 31-15, Operations against Irregular Forces (1961). The Army refined its counterinsurgency doctrine during Vietnam in FM 31-22, US Counterinsurgency Force, FM 31-16, Co

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